In this paper we investigate the relationship between home-market performance and the choice of foreign market entry mode using survey data and financial statement data of German insurance groups with property-liability business for the years 1999 to 2009. We develop a dynamic resource-based perspective and argue that strategic transformation is a major motive driving insurance groups' internationalization. Additionally, the more rapid the change for strategic transformation is, the more intense is the insurance groups' market entry mode choice. Furthermore, our findings corroborate the notion that internationalization has a positive effect on home-market performance when insurance groups are able to generate increasing premium volumes in foreign markets.
INTRODUCTION
A firm's decision to expand operations to international markets has far reaching implications that can shape operations for multiple years and impact its future profitability and growth opportunities (Berry-Stölzle and Altuntas, 2010) . Recognizing the importance of internationalization, researchers have extensively examined firm-specific, industry and environmental factors driving international expansion and performance. Focusing on the performance implications of internationalization, firm-specific factors have been heavily explored in order to explain performance differences across manufacturing firms (e.g., Bühner, 1987; Grant et al., 1988; Daniels and Bracker 1989; Tallman and Li, 1996; Hitt et al., 1997; Ruigrok and Wagner, 2003) . Although researchers theorized that theories developed to explain the internationalization of manufacturing firms are applicable to service firms (Boddewyn, Halbrich, & Perry, 1986; Katrishen and Scordis, 1998) , researchers criticized this notion and required service firms' internationalization to be analyzed separately because of the inseparability of production and consumption of the product or service which drives service firms to expand internationally in a distinct manner (Capar and Kotabe, 2003; Contractor et al., 2003) . In consequence, academic research has investigated internationalization in the insurance and reinsurance industry (Ma and Pope, 2003; Outreville, 2008; Cole et al., 2009 ). For example, Cole, Lee and McCullough (2009) investigate the factors that influence reinsurers' decision to assume reinsurance from foreign countries, whereas Ma and Pope (2003) examine the determinants of international insurers' participation in foreign markets. Also, academic research related to the relationship between internationalization and corporate performance generates a foundation from which the internationalization debate in the insurance industry can emerge (e.g. Ma and Elango, 2008; Berry-Stölzle, Hoyt and Wende, 2010) . However, the corporate focus on internationalization either defined as the function of organizational, location and industry advantages as in Cole, Lee and McCullough (2009) or international performance implications defined as the degree of product and international diversification as in Ma and Elango (2008) neglects to test the three following empirical questions:
How does home-market performance affect the decision of internationalization?

How does home-market performance influence the choice of the market entry mode?
How does internationalization affect long-term profitability in the home market?
In the tradition of Porter (1990) , internationalization is the result of competitive advantages that produce greater profitability in the home market. This greater profitability provides motivation to apply the same competences in international markets to further enhance a firm's profitability (Porter, 1990) . However, to our knowledge, no study has investigated whether profitability in the home market is linked with internationalization in the insurance industry, leading to our first research question.
Moreover, although considerable attention has been devoted to market entry modes (Pan and Tse, 2000) , to our knowledge, there exists no study that has investigated whether performance in the home market influences the choice of market entry mode, leading to research question two.
For the third question, there is long-standing empirical evidence that an international firm in a global industry has advantages in its national markets (e.g. Dunning, 1973; Kim et al., 1989; Rugman, 1979; Vernon, 1971) . However, the only study that provides empirical insights on the effects of firms' international expansion on the home market was done by Mitchell, Shaver and Yeung (1993) . Latter showed that international expansion will be beneficial in transition industries 1 , and suggest that incumbents which adapt to the changing environment by increasing their global presence, particularly firms with some prior international experience and a strong base in the home market, will often survive and gain market share. However, to our knowledge, there is no study that has investigated how internationalization affects homemarket performance.
This article attempts to broaden the focus of internationalization literature of financial firms by examining three issues: First, the article examines the effect of home-market performance on internationalization. Second, it is analyzed how home-market performance influences the choice of market entry mode. Third, the effect of insurance groups' international business on home-market performance is investigated.
In particular, theoretical considerations are articulated and then empirically tested to examine the relationship between home-market performance and the choice of foreign market entry mode, and between internationalization and home-market performance. The arguments presented here are centered around the dynamic resource-based view of a firm. The dynamic resource-based view is in the core of strategic management theory and provides multiple theoretical arguments for performance implications of internationalization. Our empirical test relates to a sample of German insurance groups ceding property-liability business across the years 1999 to 2009 which first provides a more profound observation period than prior studies, and secondly enhances the base for the internationalization debate in the insurance industry which is still in its inception. The findings of this research have the potential to offer significant implications for home-based insurance groups planning to internationalize their propertyliability business, as well as insurance groups that already run international property-liability business.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. The next section provides a first look at our results by the illustration of case examples regarding the internationalization of German insurance groups. In the third section, the literature related to internationalization in the insurance sector is reviewed. In section four, the conceptual background of this study is explained. This is followed by the data and methodology section. The sixth section presents the empirical results and the final section concludes.
RESULTS: A FIRST LOOK
Before we turn to the conceptual background of this study, we present our examples in the form of four brief case studies of insurance groups in our sample that followed different paths of internationalization. These cases are the trajectories of a winner, a newcomer, a complacent and a loser.
Winner
The winning insurance group in our study faced a paradigm change in our observation period. In 1999, the firm was mainly dependent on home-market operations, exhibited a foreign-sales to home-market sales ratio (FSHS) of 31% and ranked among the top 10 of German insurance groups in terms of premium incomes. However, home-market profitability was 8% below the market average at that time. One decade later, things had changed radically. The insurance group had increased its FSHS in P/L lines up to 270% and improved its average home-market performance to nearly 32% in 2009, excelling the average market profitability in the P/L industry by 13.5% in that year. Thus, the insurance group changed from a home-market oriented group with international aspirations towards an internationally oriented insurance group while improving the performance situation from a low performer to a high performer.
Newcomer
The second insurance group is a newcomer in international property-liability business and experienced extensive growth during our observation period. By 1999, the insurance group had no foreign operations and was purely focussed on home-market business with a homemarket profitability of 14.6%, being nearly 15% below the average market profitability in that year. Ten years later, the group exhibited a FSHS of 100% in property-liability business and had increased its total premium incomes by 85%. However, the international newcomer's premium income in the German home market retrenched by about 10%, but its profitability increased by 6.2% in the same time, exceeding the market average of 19.5% in that year. This success can be partly attributed to the fact that the group focussed on the more prospective foreign markets than battling for marginal market shares at home. The newcomer's internationalization trajectory is astonishing since it mirrors the path from a purely national insurance group towards an international niche player while increasing the profitability in the domestic setting.
Complacent
The complacent insurance group did neither increase nor decrease its FSHS during our observation period. In 1999, the insurance group could be classified as a pure home market player with a FSHS of less than 1%, and a home-market profitability far below the market average. Ten years later, things looked quite equal. The insurance group was still a pure home market player which had defended its position in the German property-liability market. And even in 2009, the ratio of foreign sales to home-market sales still accounted for less than 1%.
However, during the period 1999 to 2009, the complacent firm's home-market premium income increased by about 10%, wherein the German property-liability sector grew by more than 25% in the same period. Thus, the complacent insurance group could not sustain its domestic position or increase its international business operations during the period 1999 to 2009. In sum, the average home-market profitability of the group slightly recovered and accounted for 17.7% in 2009, being still below the average market profitability.
Loser
The fourth insurance group experienced a pitfall in international sales while it tried to perpetuate its property-liability business in the home market. In 1999, the groups' foreign sales to home-market sales ratio accounted for more than 38% while the home-market profitability was 27% above the market average. By 2009, the share of foreign sales to home-market sales had been completely eroded to less than 1%. In sum, the total premium income in the propertyliability line retrenched by about 20% over the period, wherein the national premium growth of 17% could not recoup the erosion of foreign premium incomes. The average profitability accounted for 35.9% in 2009, a dip of 21% compared to 1999.
LITERATURE REVIEW
In the past decade, several studies have made first inroads into the internationalization debate in the insurance industry. Looking from an economic perspective, one end of the spectrum of academic research has investigated macroeconomic and industry-specific factors and its impacts on foreign insurers' participation as well as market profitability (Ma and Pope, 2003 , 2008a , 2008b Cole, Lee and McCullough, 2009 ). For instance, Ma and Pope (2003) ex-plore factors describing the desirability of international insurers' involvement and find that more liberal market structure and higher gross domestic product are important factors for OECD countries' attraction to international non-life insurers. Further, they find that for noncompetitive markets reducing trade barriers would significantly increase insurers' desirability to enter these markets. Deepening our understanding on the market liberalization-profitability relationship for a selection of 23 non-life markets, Ma and Pope (2008a) find an interactive relationship between market concentration and market liberalization on profitability, whereby market profitability varies with the level of market liberalization and reverses at high levels of market concentration and market liberalization. Lastly, Cole, Lee and McCullough (2009) included firm-specific factors into their economic perspective for the investigation of the eclectic paradigm for the U.S. reinsurance market for the period 1996 through 2000. Their findings confirm that market size, loss experience, and competitive environment are key determinants revealed by reinsurers for internationalization. Notable is the result that more profitable U.S. reinsurers assume less risk from foreign markets, whereas size and geographic concentration positively affect reinsurers to assume risks from foreign markets. It must be noted that due to the nature of reinsurance business that allows intensive internationalization without significant, physical presence in host countries, the results by Cole, Lee and McCullough (2009) On the other end of the spectrum, researchers have concentrated on firm-specific factors to either explain economies of scale (Katrishen and Scordis, 1998) or corporate performance implications of internationalization Schoenmaker, Osterloo and Winkels, 2008; Berry-Stölzle, Hoyt and Wende, 2010) . For example, Ma and Elango (2008) investigate the impact of internationalization on corporate performance for U.S. property-liability insurers and find insurers with low product diversification levels to benefit of internationalization, whereby with increasing levels of product diversification insurers suffer of extensive internationalization. Another more recent study by Berry-Stölzle, Hoyt and Wende (2010) investigating successful business strategies for insurers in emerging countries provides evidence that concentration on life insurance, insurer's growth rate and increased size positively affect performance in emerging markets.
In sum, prior studies have neglected to isolate home market business from international business to investigate how home-market performance influences an insurance groups' decision of internationalization. Furthermore, there is a large gap in insurance literature explaining the choice of insurance groups' foreign market entry mode. Finally, there has been no investigation in how far the foreign market entry mode influences the success in international markets and its effect on home-market performance. In addition, none of the mentioned studies applies a theoretical perspective which grounds on the resource-based view of the firm, revealing our study to provide a more complete picture of the organizations' determinants impacting foreign market entry mode choice and home-market performance. Lastly, our study is the first to investigate internationalization for a non U.S. based insurance industry, therefore adding empirical evidence for the European insurance industry.
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
Our analysis of the relationship between home-market performance and internationalization, home-market performance and the choice of foreign market entry mode and the effect of internationalization on home-market performance is built upon the resource-based view literature. Firstly, we pose the working definitions for our remaining work before we review the literature of the resource-based view, and highlight the importance in regard to internationalization and market entry mode. Finally, we develop our hypotheses.
Working definitions
In this study, international diversification or interchangeably internationalization means that an insurer affiliated to a group earns positive direct premiums written in property-liability lines in at least one country outside Germany. In this sense, this definition is narrower than typical definitions in strategic management which, for example, define internationalization solely as a firm's expansion beyond the borders of its home country across different countries and geographical regions (e.g. Capar and Kotabe, 2003) . Thus, internationalization does not mean group internal value creation by insurance groups' service entities outside the home country that has no impact on the direct gross premiums written.
Further, we investigate insurance groups with property-liability business lines in regard to our research questions. In analogy to Liebenberg and Sommer (2008) , who define multi-line insurers as those ceding more than one line of business, we define a composite insurance group to have at least two insurers with property-liability business affiliated. Instead, specialized insurance groups have only one property-liability insurer affiliated to the controlling group organization.
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The resource-based view Heterogeneity of capabilities and resources in a population of firms is one of the cornerstones of resource-based theory (Peteraf, 1993) . A firm's resources are all "those tangible and intangible assets which are tied semipermanently to the firm" (Wernerfelt, 1984: 172) . For in-stance, knowledge about investment instruments, quantitative models, access to trading platforms, and the like can be viewed as independent resources. Capabilities refer to a combination of resources that creates higher-order competencies (Madhok, 1997) . The efficient exploitation of a firm's resources and capabilities as well as their effective and efficient development are the main drivers of competitive advantage (March, 1991) . In other words, bundles of resources and capabilities lie at the heart of a firm's competitive advantage (Mehra, 1996) . However, only if a firm exploits its competitive advantage to cement its lead -thus, creating a situation when other firms are unable to catch up and to duplicate the benefits of this strategy -then this competitive advantage is suggested to be a sustained one (Barney, 1991) . In this sense, firms can exploit resources and capabilities to establish sustained competitive advantages to yield higher levels of profitability than the competition (Barney, 1991) . Although market-based frameworks suggest that it is the market that determines the value of resources, mirrored in privileged end-product market positions as a basis for above normal performance (Makhija, 2003) , we build our hypotheses mainly on resource-based view arguments because the consideration of foreign market environments would exceed the desired simplicity of the theoretical framework.
Hypothesis development
Home-market performance hypothesis
Grounding on resource-based theory, researchers have argued that firms with strong core competencies that have been developed in the home country can be utilized in international markets (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1998) . Put differently, firms with specific advantages can leverage these advantages across geographic boundaries to provide firm-level and competitive advantages (Teece, 1985 (Teece, , 1986 . The competitive advantages that produce greater profitability in domestic markets provide motivation to apply the same competences in international markets to further enhance a firm's profitability (Porter, 1990) .
Conversely, firms not having resources that are valuable, rare, non-imitable and nonsubstitutable have no ground to implement a value-creating strategy that can earn above average returns (Barney, 1991) . Following this logic, firms without superior home-market perfor- Thus, it sounds more reasonable to believe that internationalization is a route to strategic renewal which is largely undertaken by incumbent firms (Agarwal and Helfat, 2009 ). Consequently, internationalization of firms without superior home-market performance may ground on the recognition that the development and decay of resources and capabilities are quintessentially important to a firm's strategic future (Winter, 2007) . In this sense, internationalization mirrors an attempt to refresh or replace existing resources and capabilities as a basis for future growth (Agarwal and Helfat, 2009) . Recent results by Cole, Lee and McCullough (2009) showed a negative relationship between U.S. reinsurers' internationalization and performance. In this sense, it sounds reasonable to believe that internationalization shares a negative relationship with home-market performance for the following reason: insurance groups without superior home-market performance expand internationally to improve their competitive advantages in the home-market by using learning-effects from foreign markets. Thus, the home-market performance hypothesis evolves:
H1
Home-market performance hypothesis: Negative past home-market performance increases a firm's probability to go international.
Catch-up convergence hypothesis
In this part, we shed light on the question how home-market performance influences the intensity of the expansion strategy into foreign markets. Three major modes of foreign market entry exist ordered by the intensity of foreign investments: entry via a subsidiary, entry via branch office and entry via cross-border business. A subsidiary is defined as a judicial independent, but economically dependent company. A subsidiary may be partly or fully owned by a parent company. It is claimed that a subsidiary in control of another corporation is dependent from the corporation which is holding the majority of the subsidiary's shares (Emmerich and Habersack, 2010) . For reasons of the improvement of competitive strength at international level, subsidiaries may be grouped together and may lead to the formation of groups of parent companies and subsidiaries. 4 A subsidiary is generally incorporated in the target country and is subject to supervision by the target countries' authorities, and therefore statistically treated as a foreign company belonging to the domestic holding (Cummins and Venard, 2007) .
Instead, a branch office or interchangeably termed as "location" is defined as an economically independent and judicial dependent corporation. Put differently, a branch office is every fixed place of business that serves for a company to conduct business.
The third market entry mode, here termed as "attendance" or interchangeably crossborder business, is a way in which carriers can offer insurance business in all EU countries by being supervised by their home country authority (Cummins and Venard, 2007) . For such attendance business, no additional investments are required. For instance, an insurer may cede direct premiums via attendance by covering a domestic clients' property-and liability risks of foreign production facilities within another EU member country.
The market entry mode "attendance" does not require any monetary or human capital investments to cede additional premiums in foreign markets. Thus, attendance is the market entry mode with the lowest intensity. Instead, operating in foreign markets via location at least requires monetary investment to build up the fixed place to conduct business and human capital investments for local staff that serves the market demand for the insurance products. Since the market entry mode "location" allows outsourcing of all higher-order capability activities to the parent group, the monetary and human-capital investments are limited, therefore making "location" to a medium intense market entry mode. Entering markets with the entry mode of a "subsidiary" requires significant monetary and human-capital investments in order to fulfill local supervision authorities' requirements and therefore denotes as the most intense market entry mode.
Following the logic in the home-market performance hypothesis, firms with a need for refreshment of resources and capabilities are more likely to expand their business internationally. In their work, Cockburn et al. (2000) find support for the hypothesis that firms that are initially in disadvantaged positions will try more aggressively to adopt a practice that allows them to narrow the performance gap. 'Catch-up convergence' is taken as a proof that strategic choices exist, at least partially, to overcome the initial condition (Cockburn et al., 2000) . Applying the idea of the 'catch-up convergence' to the insurance industry, it seems compelling to believe that the poorer an insurance groups' home-market performance is, the more aggressively an insurance group will utilize the vehicle of internationalization in order to 'catch-up' performance. In other words, poor home-market performance will be correlated with increasing market entry mode intensity. Past research supports this idea and states that the preferred mode to exploit a firm's in house resources and capabilities would be establishing a new subsidiary (Erramilli, Agarval and Dev, 2002; Madhok, 1997) . Market entry via subsidiary may have the required thrust to influence the whole organization and the potential to leverage home-market performance (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1998) . On the other hand of the spectrum, subsidiaries offer the doors for cross-subsidization (Kogut, 1985) . In sum, the catch-up convergence hypothesis by Cockburn et al. (2000) and prior findings on the preferred market entry mode literature lead us to hypothesize that the poorer an insurance groups' home-market performance, the more prone will a group be to enter foreign markets with the most intense market entry mode.
Thus, the catch-up convergence hypothesis evolves.
H2
Catch-up convergence hypothesis: Negative past home-market performance increases a firm's probability to enter foreign markets with the most intense market entry mode.
Degree of internationalization hypothesis
Now we question how the desired development and decay of resources and capabilities in foreign markets may influence home-market performance in the long run. In the tradition of the dynamic resource-based theory, internationalization entails capability replication of firms' core capabilities in other geographic markets (Winter and Szulanski, 2001) , entry into foreign markets may not only contribute to capability replication, retrenchment or retirement, but might also lead to a renewal or recombination of firms' capabilities in some way (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003 Mitchell et al. (1993) find that the more extensive the international status of a participant in its industry, the stronger its performance in the home market. Barlett and Ghoshal (1998) confirm these findings and state that the accrual of strategically important resources and capabilities in foreign markets should enhance home-market performance because added-values can be transferred to the home market organization. Following prior arguments, we reveal that the stronger an insurance group in international markets is, the greater will be the benefit of internationalization on home-market performance. We take the annual premium development of international sales as a measure for an insurance groups 'international status' (Mitchell et al., 1993: 422) .
In consequence, our degree of internationalization hypothesis evolves:
H3
Degree of internationalization hypothesis: Past positive changes in foreign
premiums increase a firm's probability to achieve higher home-market performance.
In addition, following variables are hypothesized to have an influencing effect on internationalization and home-market performance:
Size
Firm size is widely used to control for economies and diseconomies of scale on the corporate level (e.g. Hitt et al., 1997, Ma and Luhnen, 2009 ). Cummins and Zi (1998) reported large insurers to have higher operational efficiencies. Larger firms have lower insolvency risk and should be able to charge higher prices than smaller insurers (Sommer, 1996) leading to better capital endowments. Organization size is a common factor used to measure the capacity of the firm (e.g., Aaby and Slater, 1989; Ali and Camp, 1993; Javalgi, Griffith, and White, 2003) . Based on previous research, we use the natural logarithm of a firm's assets (Size) as a measure for firm size Luhnen, 2009) . Size is expected to positively moderate insurance groups' home-market performance.
Risky
Loubergé (1983) and Galan, and Gonzalez-Benito (2001) are among many authors who suggest that participation in the global marketplace can serve as a form of risk diversification.
Corroborating this notion, Cummins and Venard (2008) argue that insurers can mitigate the effects of underwriting cycles by diversifying their risk exposure by line and geographically.
We define riskiness as the ratio of stock and real estate to total assets (Risky) mirroring the risk of an insurance groups' investment, whereby the expected impact on home-market performance remains unclear.
Mutual
In the insurance industry, the organizational types of stock insurers, owned by stockholders, and mutual insurers, owned by policyholders, coexist. On one end of the spectrum, mutual insurers are hypothesized to generate greater cost efficiencies by a better control of the manager-policyholder relationship. On the other end of the spectrum, stock insurers have greater access to capital and endure higher pressure to maximize profits (Colquitt et al., 1999) .
We dummy a mutual insurance group (Mutual) as 1 if the organizational type of the insurance group is a mutual and zero otherwise. Stock insurers have an advantage over mutual insurers by the access to capital markets . However, insurance groups in the German market exhibit mixed organizational forms. Although most mutual insurance groups' domestic subsidiaries are stock corporations, these insurance groups are accounted as mutual holdings as noted by Farny et al. (2011) and not as stock holding companies. Such insurance groups with the organizational form of a mutual that hold subsidiary firms with the organizational form of stock corporations are expected to combine the advantages of both organizational forms. Therefore, it is expected that the organizational form of a mutual insurance group has a positive impact on home-market performance.
Leverage
Leverage is expected to affect the probability of bankruptcy. When companies are in financial distress, they try to avoid bankruptcy by restructuring their assets and liabilities (Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein, 1994). Jensen (1989) has even argued that highly leveraged firms that are in financial distress should find it easier to restructure out of court. Since they are highly leveraged, they trigger financial distress even if operations have not deteriorated much.
Highly leveraged companies are likely to compete less aggressively for market share when there is greater urgency to produce current cash flows (Opler, Saron and Titman, 1997) . In some cases, the less aggressive stance taken by a financially distressed firm may actually work to the advantage of all the firms in the industry. Financial leverage affects firms' risk of equity return, but its influence is likely to be felt more strongly among firms that are not doing well (Chan and Chen, 1991) . High current financial leverage may restrict the firms' accessibility to external financing, especially during tight credit periods. And since highly leveraged companies are subject to cost of debt, we expect that they are more cautious when underwriting risk.
Following prior research by Elango, Ma and Pope (2008) , we control for this relationship by including a proxy for a firm's leverage (Leverage), where the leverage ratio is defined as liabilities divided by a firm's surplus, common stock, and preferred capital stock. We expect this variable to share a negative relationship with home-market performance. Sommer (1996) finds that safer insurers are able to command higher prices. Following Liebenberg and Sommer (2008) , capitalization is measured as the ratio of policyholder surplus to total assets (Capasset). However, in their investigation of internal capital markets in insurance groups, Powell, Sommer and Eckles (2008) argue that when an insurer increases its premiums written, there are three possibilities in order to maintain the probability of bankruptcy:
Capitalization
holding more capital, increasing premiums ceded to reinsurers, and lastly altering the loss exposure. On the one hand, internationalization offers insurers to diversify their loss exposure.
On the other hand, internationalization may require significant capital investments. Therefore, we expect a negative relationship between capitalization and internationalized insurance groups' home-market performance.
Product-Diversification
Insurers can diversify their operations by participating in multiple lines of business.
One strand of researches has found that specialized insurers outperform diversified insurers (Hoyt and Trieschmann, 1991; Tombs and Hoyt, 1994; Cummins et al., 2003; Liebenberg and Sommer, 2008) . Conversely, supporters of the conglomeration hypothesis have found diversification to lead to increased performance (Meador et al., 2000; Villalonga, 2004) . We measure product diversification in terms of a Herfindahl index of premiums on product lines (HHI).
Given the contradicting results of prior research the anticipated relationship between productdiversification and home-market performance is unclear.
Life
Although our sample firms all write P/L insurance, several firms in the sample also write L/H business. We control for an insurer's participation in both industries by including a dummy variable (Life) equal to 1 if the insurance group also sells life insurance products and 0 otherwise. Hoyt and Trieschmann (1991) compare risk-return relationships between publicly traded insurers that specialize in either P/L or L/H insurance and those that diversify across both major segments of the aggregate insurance industry. They find that specialized insurers performed better over the sample period of 1973 to1987. Tombs and Hoyt (1994) examine the relation between stock returns and product-line focus for a panel of 26 insurers (operating in P/L and L/H) for the period 1980 to 1990. In their regression analysis of stock returns on focus and several controls, they find that stock returns are positively related to focus. Thus, both Hoyt and Trieschmann (1991) and Tombs and Hoyt (1994) provide evidence consistent with the strategic focus hypothesis. Given the fact that the majority of prior empirical literature supports the strategic focus hypothesis, we expect Life to share a negative relationship with homemarket performance.
In addition to the above firm-specific controls, we include year dummies and line of business controls in each regression. The line of business control variables measure the fraction of premiums written in each line of business and, hence, capture differences between business lines including differences in the loss distributions and volatilities of the business lines.
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY Our initial sample was constructed by the following rules. To be included, a firm had to: (1) be a ceding insurance group licensed in Germany and offering property-liability coverage in at least one line-of-business, (2) ance markets, the proliferation of supranational free-trade areas, the harmonization of accounting standards were undertaken during this period (Cummins and Venard, 2007; Cummins and Venard, 2008) . Third, for the first time true price and product competition in property-liability insurance has become true in the European insurance market (Cummins and Weiss, 2004) , which enables us to test the hypotheses adequately. Fourth, the German insurance industry de- 5 The correlation matrix of independent variables is not reported to conserve space. However, variance inflations factors are all well below the benchmark of 10 suggested by Belsley, Kuh, and Welch (1980) . Thus, multicollinearity does not appear to be an issue in our sample. 6 The lines-of-business included in the calculation are: personal accident, personal liability, total auto, legal expenses, fire, homeowners' personal property, residential and commercial building damage and transportation. We merged the home market financial statement data with primary data of a survey capturing foreign business profiles of all insurance companies. Our only screen is to exclude insurance companies under public law because these corporations are not allowed to expand their operations internationally by institution. The importance of insurance companies under public law is minor, both with respect to the number of companies and the premium volume written (Cummins and Venard, 2007) . 8 For the residual number of 98 insurers, we first sent a questionnaire to the companies and then conducted standardized telephone interviews. 93 of the 98 property-liability insurers participated in our survey which corresponds to a response rate of 94%. These insurance companies account for more than 90% of the overall premium volume of the German property-liability insurance market. The 93 insurance companies were then aggregated to groups. For unaffiliated insurance companies, each single company was accounted as its own pseudo group. Our resulting sample of unbalanced data is representative for German insurance groups with property-liability business and comprises 521 firm-year observations.
Home-market performance
The interesting link for our home-market performance hypothesis is internationalization and performance. In this connection, we focus on home-market performance. Two accountingbased measures were initially considered as possible indicators of insurance groups' homemarket performance: return on assets (ROA), and return on equity (ROE). The use of ROE and/or ROA as a proxy for measurements of an insurer's financial performance is consistent with prior research (e.g., Grant, Jammine, and Thomas, 1988; Pottier and Sommer, 1999; Lai Browne, Carson, and Hoyt, 2001 ).
However, since a prior study by Berry-Stölzle, Hoyt and Wende (2010) investigates successful business strategies for insurers in emerging markets on group level, we also employ ROE as a measure for insurance groups' performance. In addition, we add risk-adjusted return on equity (RAROE) as a proxy for long-term performance (see Browne, Carson and Hoyt, 2001 ), because insurance groups with higher returns may be exposed to greater levels of risk (Elango, Ma and Pope, 2008) .
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To detect the determinants of internationalization, we focus on time series variation in the foreign business profile of insurance groups. We model an insurer's decision to go international using a logistic regression model. The specification of the model is as follows: 
where the subscript i represents the insurance group, t represents time, and ε i,t is the company-specific random error term. Table 1 .
Catch-up convergence
Hypothesis II focuses on the mode of foreign market entry of insurance groups. We analyze the relationship between mode of foreign market entry and past home-market performance. The more intense the market entry strategy, the greater is the value of the ordered dependent variable i ENTRY . Following our catch-up convergence hypothesis, we argue that the poorer an insurance groups' home-market performance, the more prone will a group be to enter foreign markets with the most intense market entry mode. In sum, the specification of the model is as follows:
i i t i t x i t x i t x i t i t Log ENTRY r RAROE or ROE
where r ϵ {1,2,3}. The ENTRY variable is an ordinal variable taking on value from 1 to 3 that represents the choice of foreign market entry mode, ordered ascending by the intensity of foreign investments: 1=Attendance, 2=Location and 3=Subsidiary. The model is estimated using ordered logit regressions. All independent variables are lagged one (t-x; x=1) and two years (tx; x=2) to mitigate potential endogeneity. Standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering.
A negative and significant estimate for 1  would support our catch-up convergence hypothesis.
Degree of internationalization
Hypothesis III focuses on the relationship between changes in foreign market premiums and home-market performance. As proxy for degree of internationalization, we use changes in the inflation-adjusted total premiums written in foreign markets (ΔFORPREM). More precisely, we use two measures: Delta I FORPREM, which is the (x t -x t-1 ) difference of the inflationadjusted total premiums written in foreign markets, and Delta II FORPREM, which is the (x t2x t-1 +x t-2 ) difference of difference of the inflation-adjusted total premiums written in foreign markets. Similar measures has been widely used in the literature on relationship between internationalization and performance (e.g. Contractor et al., 2003; Daniels and Bracker, 1989; Geringer et al, 1989; Hitt et al., 1997; Ruigrok and Wagner, 2003) . Our hypothesis is that insurers with high degree of internationalization are more likely to perform well in their home market.
Consistent with our catch-up convergence hypothesis, in which we argue that insurers with less home-market performance will choose a more intense foreign market entry mode (in terms of investments), we now hypothesize that insurers accomplishing a high degree of internationalization are more likely to generate higher home-market performance. Thus, insurers will use learning effects from foreign market engagements to achieve positive performance in their home market. The specification of the model is as follows:
where , i t ROE is equal to net income (surplus) divided by total assets for insurer i in year t, and , i t RAROE its standard deviation over past 3 years. X is a vector of control variables, and , i t  is a random error term. All independent variables are lagged one (t-x; x=1) and two years (t-x; x=2) to mitigate potential endogeneity. Standard errors are adjusted for firmlevel clustering. A positive and significant estimate for 1  would support our degree of internationalization hypothesis. Since our study consist of two data sources, survey data illustrating firms' foreign business profiles and domestic-market financial statement data, we differentiate between "internationalization variables" and "firm-specific domestic-market variables". The impact and importance of these variables may differ and is outlined in the section "Conceptual Background and Hypotheses" of the paper. Table 2 shows a univariate comparison between insurers engaging in foreign markets in addition, and purely domestic insurers. In the full panel dataset, 44.2% of all observations are from firms that are engaged in foreign markets (23 of 52 insurance groups in total). Descriptive statistics for firms with International=1 and firms with International=0 are based on the full dataset. We use a t-test and the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test to examine whether domestic-market characteristics differs significantly between the two groups.
RESULTS
Univariate results
10 For simplicity we refer to firm-year observations as "firms" from this point forward.
We can see that the average internationalized firm exhibits a relatively low riskadjusted home-market performance and is much larger than the average purely domestic firm.
Internationalized firms have, on average, a lower capitalization or, in other words, a higher financial leverage than purely domestic firms. The organizational form of a mutual is more prevalent in the group of purely domestic insurers. Furthermore, internationalized firms hold, on average, more risky assets, and also seem to have a lower Herfindahl index, indicating that they are more likely diversified in terms of product diversification.
Logistic regression of internationalization on home-market performance
The logistic regression results from Equation (1) are presented in Table 3 . The dependent INT indicator variable is equal to 1 if insurer is internationalized, 0 otherwise. The four models presented only vary with respect to the control variables included. In all four models the risk-adjusted home-market performance variable, RAROE, and the coefficients on the oneand two-year lagged home-market performance variable, ROE, are negative and significant, indicating a negative relationship between past performance and internationalization. The magnitude of this effect is quite large. A one standard deviation decrease in the RAROE variable, or in other words a drop in a firm's RAROE by 0.030 (or about 3%), increases an insurer's probability to go international by 0.0640, which corresponds to a 15.22% increase relative to the 0.4204 sample mean. These results provide support for the home-market performance hypothesis (H1), which states that firms with negative past home-market performance are, all else equal, more likely to go international.
In addition, the coefficients of the Size variable (t-1 and t-2) are positive and significant in all four models, indicating that larger firms are more likely to expand internationally. This result is consistent with the findings of Outreville (2010), and De Nicoló et al. (2004) .
As expected, holding risky assets is significantly positively associated with the likelihood of going international, confirming that global marketplace can serve as a form of risk diversification (Loubergé, 1983; Galan and Gonzalez-Benito, 2001 ). Thus, risky firms are more likely to expand internationally.
The coefficients of the Mutual variable are negative and significant in all four models, indicating that mutual insurers are less likely to expand internationally. Since mutual insurers address agency conflicts between managers and owners by restricting managerial discretion and risk taking (Mayers and Smith, 1981; Lamm-Tennant and Starks, 1993) , mutual insurers may benefit less from foreign markets than stock insurers.
Choice of foreign market entry mode
To examine whether past home-market performance affects the foreign market entry mode of a firm, we first analyze the main differences between the entry modes. Table 4 presents the results of a t-test (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test) of the null hypotheses that the mean (median) of firm-specific domestic and foreign market characteristics differs significantly between the entry modes. While there are significantly differences between all three modes, the highest significant differences occur between Subsidiary and Attendance, and Location and Attendance.
The main differences are: Firms entering foreign markets via Subsidiary fit their foreign market strategies with that of their domestic market more likely than others, they offer more differ-ent types of products in their foreign market, but are less profitable in their home market. In contrast, firms entering foreign markets via branch-offices (Location) exhibit higher homemarket performance. Another notable difference between the entry modes is that firms doing cross-border business (Attendance) are mainly mutual insurers.
The ordered logistic regression results from Equation (2) are presented in Table 5 . We use ENTRY as dependent variable to test our catch-up convergence hypothesis (H2). In all models, performance is significantly negatively related to ENTRY, indicating that insurers with poorer home-market performance are more likely to invest in the most intense foreign market entry mode.
Similar to the logistic regression results from Equation (1), Risky is significantly positively associated with ENTRY, confirming the risk diversification argument once more (Loubergé, 1983; Galan and Gonzalez-Benito, 2001 ). The coefficients of the Mutual variable are again negative and significant in all models, indicating that mutual insurers are less likely to invest in an intense market entry mode. Furthermore, Capasset is, as expected, negative and significant in all models, which is consistent with previous research (Powell, Sommer and Eckles, 2008) . Table 6 presents the regression results from Equation (3). To test our degree of internationalization hypothesis (H3), we perform ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of changes in the foreign market premiums, as proxy for degree of internationalization, on home-market performance. In all models, changes in foreign premiums are positive and significant, indicating that insurers with successful foreign businesses achieve, on average, higher home-market performance. The variables Size, Mutual, and Capasset are all positive and significant, pointing out that large stock insurer with high capitalization exhibit, all else equal, higher home-market performance. Thus, our hypothesis is confirmed that insurance groups that enter international markets and expand successfully will benefit of greater profitability in the home market.
Degree of internationalization and home-market performance
CONCLUSION
This study investigates the relationship between home-market performance and internationalization decisions. Our first result shows that home-market performance is negatively associated with internationalization. For the first relationship, we also find that size moderates insurance groups' home-market performance, indicating that economies of scale may be apparent. For the catch-up convergence hypothesis, our findings show that the poorer an insurance groups home-market performance, the more will an insurance group strive to close these performance differences through the utilization of the most intense market entry mode, entry via subsidiary.
For the third relationship, we find that increasing inflation adjusted premium volumes in international markets are positively associated to home-market performance. This indicates that internationalization may be beneficial also for the home market organization when the insurance group is able to increasingly shift its business towards foreign countries. However, prior to enjoying internationalization advantages and higher home-market performance, a valuable resource and capability stock must be accrued in foreign markets that enables to catch-up and finally improve home-market performance.
The study's first finding is surprising since it complements prior theoretical arguments by researchers. In this tradition, firms with above normal performance expand to international markets to further enhance overall performance (Porter, 1990) . Instead, our findings contradict this notion and show that the poorer an insurance groups' home-market performance, the more prone it is to enter foreign markets. This is not surprising since internationalization often functions as a vehicle for strategic transformation (Agarwal and Helfat, 2009; Helfat et al., 2007) .
The second finding of this study also corroborates our expectations, but adds new empirical insights for the market entry literature in the insurance industry. The fact that diminishing home-market performance shares a positive relationship with market entry mode intensity corroborates the catch-up convergence hypothesis and adds a new insight for the insurance industry. Thus, the accrual of resources and capabilities is a major drive for insurance groups to heavily expand into foreign markets.
The study's last finding, the degree of internationalization hypothesis is also not surprising and supports theoretical arguments stressed by Mitchell et al. (1993) and Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998) . Thus, insurance groups that successfully expand their international presence and transfer learning effects from international operations to their domestic base will perform well in their own home market. The finding corroborates that learning from foreign operations in order to attain performance improvements in the home market exists. Revealing that subsidiaries in the form of strategic leaders create the necessary thrust to influence the whole organization (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1998) and that firms with extensive international operations often achieve superior performance (Morck and Yeung, 1991) , it is not surprising increasing foreign premiums share a positive relationship with risk-adjusted home-market performance.
This study has implications for researchers in strategic management and insurance groups' expansion strategy. Our study provides strong support that internationalization is a strategy highly pursued by insurance groups that are in search for resources and capabilities, striving for a strategic transformation (Agrawal and Helfat, 2009 ). Furthermore, it shows that the market entry mode in foreign business is a key determinant for the success or failure of a strategy to accrue resources and capabilities and to catch-up performance. Geographically diversified insurance groups are exposed to a rich array of environments, which leads to higher innovation levels (Ghoshal, 1987; Kim, Hwang and Burgers, 1993) . Thus, the choice of the foreign market entry mode directs the future learning opportunities and therefore the potential for long-term performance improvement in the home market. Porter (1980) , 0 otherwise Focus Dummy variable equal to 1 if insurer pursues the focus strategy in foreign business according to Porter (1980) , 0 otherwise Cost Dummy variable equal to 1 if insurer pursues the cost leadership strategy in foreign business according to Porter (1980) , 0 otherwise Furthermore, significant reforms of German company law system were implemented in 1998. Therefore, the observation period begins with 1999. Thus, our risk-adjusted performance measure (RAROE) has 349 firm-year observations. To get reliable univariate and multivariate performance-related results, we also consider return on equity (ROE) as performance measure, for which we have the full number of firm-year observations (N=521). The internationalization variables are based on survey responses and reflect insurers with foreign business in addition (23 unique insurance groups), in which the firm-year observation is 212. INT is a dummy variable equal to 1 if insurer has foreign business, 0 otherwise. Subsidiary is a foreign market entry mode dummy variable equal to 1 if insurer has a foreign subsidiary, 0 otherwise. Location is a foreign market entry mode dummy variable equal to 1 if insurer has set up a foreign base (branch office), 0 otherwise. Attendance is a foreign market entry mode dummy variable equal to 1 if insurer has cross-border business, 0 otherwise. FSHS is calculated as foreign-sales divided by domestic-market sales. Adjustment is a dummy variable equal to 1 if insurer fits its foreign market strategies with that of the domestic market, 0 otherwise. Difference is a dummy variable equal to 1 if insurer pursues the differentiation strategy in foreign business according to Porter (1980) , 0 otherwise. Focus is a dummy variable equal to 1 if insurer pursues the focus strategy in foreign business according to Porter (1980) , 0 otherwise. Cost is a dummy variable equal to 1 if insurer pursues the cost leadership strategy in foreign business according to Porter (1980) , 0 otherwise. RAROE is the standard deviation of return on equity (ROE) over past 3 years. ROE is equal to net income divided by total assets. Size is equal to the natural logarithm the total assets. Risky is (stock + real estate) divided by total assets. Mutual is a dummy variable equal to 1 if insurer is a mutual company, 0 otherwise. Leverage is direct premiums written divided by surplus.
Capasset is equal to the ratio of the equity capital to total assets. HHI is the line-of-business Herfindahl index. Life is a dummy variable equal to 1 if insurer has life insurance business, 0 otherwise. Notes: Statistical significance of differences between internationalized and purely domestic insurance groups is based on a t-test for means and a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for medians. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. RAROE (risk-adjusted performance measure) is the standard deviation of return on equity (ROE) over past 3 years. ROE is equal to net income divided by total assets. Size is equal to the natural logarithm of total assets. Risky is (stock + real estate) divided by total assets. Mutual is a dummy variable equal to 1 if insurer is a mutual company, 0 otherwise. Leverage is direct premiums written divided by surplus. Capasset is equal to the ratio of the equity capital to total assets. HHI is the line-of-business Herfindahl index. Life is a dummy variable equal to 1 if insurer has life insurance business, 0 otherwise. Notes: The dependent variable in all four logistic regression models is an INT indicator equal to 1 if insurer has foreign business, 0 otherwise. All independent variables are measured in year t-1 and t-2. RAROE (riskadjusted performance measure) is the standard deviation of return on equity (ROE) over past 3 years. ROE is equal to net income divided by total assets. Size is equal to the natural logarithm of total assets. Risky is (stock + real estate) divided by total assets. Mutual is a dummy variable equal to 1 if insurer is a mutual company, 0 otherwise. Leverage is direct premiums written divided by surplus. Capasset is equal to the ratio of the equity capital to total assets. HHI is the line-of-business Herfindahl index. Life is a dummy variable equal to 1 if insurer has life insurance business, 0 otherwise. Line of business controls are calculated by dividing premiums written in each line of business by total premiums written. Year dummies are included in each regression. Standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering and appear in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Notes: The dependent variable in all four ordered logistic regression models is ENTRY, an ordinal variable taking on value from 1 to 3 that represents the entry mode strategies: 1=Attendance, 2=Location and 3=Subsidiary. We use ENTRY to test whether the degree of incorporation in foreign markets is affected by past home-market performance. Thus, the higher the value of ENTRY, the higher is the degree of incorporation. All independent variables are measured in year t-1 and t-2. RAROE (risk-adjusted performance measure) is the standard deviation of return on equity (ROE) over past 3 years. ROE is equal to net income divided by total assets. Size is equal to the natural logarithm of total assets. Risky is (stock + real estate) divided by total assets. Mutual is a dummy variable equal to 1 if insurer is a mutual company, 0 otherwise. Leverage is direct premiums written divided by surplus. Capasset is equal to the ratio of the equity capital to total assets. HHI is the line-of-business Herfindahl index. Life is a dummy variable equal to 1 if insurer has life insurance business, 0 otherwise. Line of business controls are calculated by dividing premiums written in each line of business by total premiums written. Year dummies are included in each regression. Standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering and appear in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Notes: The dependent variable in all four regression models is a risk-adjusted performance measure. RAROE is the standard deviation of return on equity over past 3 years. ROE is equal to net income divided by total assets. All independent variables are measured in year t-1 and t-2. Delta I FORPREM is the (x t -x t-1 ) difference of the inflation-adjusted total premiums written in foreign markets. Delta II FORPREM is the (x t -2x t-1 +x t-2 ) difference of difference of the inflation-adjusted total premiums written in foreign markets. Size is equal to the natural logarithm of total assets. Risky is (stock + real estate) divided by total assets. Mutual is a dummy variable equal to 1 if insurer is a mutual company, 0 otherwise. Leverage is direct premiums written divided by surplus. Capasset is equal to the ratio of the equity capital to total assets. HHI is the line-of-business Herfindahl index. Life is a dummy variable equal to 1 if insurer has life insurance business, 0 otherwise. Line of business controls are calculated by dividing premiums written in each line of business by total premiums written. Year dummies are included in each regression. Standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering and appear in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
